



FTC Policy Perspectives on Certificates of Public Advantage

Staff Policy Paper

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Introduction

This paper by Federal Trade Commission staff presents information for state lawmakers considering proposed legislation regarding Certificate of Public Advantage (“COPA”) ~~laws~~ The FTC routinely

Mergers that lead to lower prices or better health outcomes for patients are unlikely to violate antitrust laws and thus would not require COPAs to mitigate anticompetitive harms.

Why should state lawmakers be concerned about hospital consolidation?

Healthcare experts consistently find that highly concentrated healthcare markets are more likely to have higher prices for consumers (e.g., patients and employers who fund employee health plans), reduced quality of care and patient health outcomes, and reduced access to healthcare services. Most studies show that competition among health systems ~~not consolidation~~ results in the lowest prices

Hospitals seeking COPAs have also cited concerns about low reimbursement rates or future reductions in reimbursement that may occur as a result of declining admissions and healthcare reform efforts. They argue their proposed mergers would improve their financial condition and enable them to meet

Finally, hospitals argue lawmakers should not be concerned about the negative effects of their proposed merger, because the states can impose various types of regulatory conditions on COPA recipients that would mitigate the harms resulting from consolidation. Common examples include price controls and rate regulation, mechanisms for sharing cost savings efficiencies with local residents, public reporting of quality metrics, and commitments regarding certain contractual provisions between the hospitals and commercial health insurers. But such conditions do not replicate the benefits of competition; rather, they distort competition. They are also challenging and costly to implement, requiring considerable supervision, as hospitals subject to COPAs often have strong financial incentives to evade the regulatory conditions, thus undermining their efficacy.²⁷

FTC efforts to prevent harmful hospital consolidation are undermined by COPAs

The FTC is an independent, bipartisan agency with a dual mission of promoting competition and protecting consumers. Under its statutory mandate, the FTC challenges mergers and acquisitions that are likely to substantially lessen competition and harm consumers.²⁸ Anticompetitive mergers and conduct in healthcare markets have long been a focus of FTC law enforcement, research, and advocacy.²⁹ The FTC has considerable experience in evaluating mergers involving hospitals, outpatient facilities, and physician groups to determine whether they are, on balance, likely to benefit or harm consumers.³⁰

At the heart of FTC investigations is how healthcare mergers impact patients, employees, employees in local communities. FTC staff considers a wide range of factors, including the impact on prices charged to patients, wages paid to hospital employees following greater employer concentration, patient health outcomes and quality of care, and access to healthcare services, and the potential for the merger to result in innovative healthcare delivery and payment models. We often consult physician experts with experience in both clinical and academic research settings, to help us evaluate the hospitals' quality of care and health improvement claims. Staff also speaks to local business and community members, including other healthcare providers, public and private employers, and health insurers, to understand how mergers will impact them. We receive a significant amount of public and nonpublic information, including business documents and data from the merging hospitals and other market participants. Staff also performs an economic analysis of hospital discharge data, as well as a financial analysis of the merging hospitals. Notably, these factors are similar to those that state health departments are required to consider when evaluating COPAs. However, the FTC has spent several decades and substantial resources to develop expertise evaluating mergers, and state health departments often have different areas of expertise.

There are certainly circumstances where a bona fide regulatory approach that has the side effect of limiting competition may be an appropriate way to implement important public policy goals. Yet, the available evidence shows COPAs do not achieve the purported policy goals of reducing healthcare costs and improving quality. Instead, COPAs shield specific hospital transactions from vigorous antitrust enforcement, to the detriment of those very goals. Antitrust authorities are better positioned to

This suggests that the COPA was effective in constraining prices to the level of hospitals, but that the COPA removal led to higher prices consistent with the exercise of market power by an unconstrained hospital monopoly.³⁷ The CEO of Benefis has stated that, although he did not observe the post-COPA price increases found in this study, he does not believe COPAs adequately address the rising costs of healthcare.

An attorney hired by the Montana Department of Justice to oversee the Benefis Health COPA stated:

My bottom line is that COPA regulation is fraught with difficulties. Regulations can become obsolete and less effective over time. State regulators become forced to resolve competitive battles, and the political pressure is considerable. And most significantly, the end game or exit strategy can be a problem and might leave you with a concentrated, but unregulated market power.³⁸

Also, a policy advisor for

In 2020, Prisma Health persuaded DHEC to expand the original COPA to include LifePoint's hospital and emergency room assets in the greater Columbia area. This maneuver potentially would have allowed Prisma Health to acquire these facilities without facing an antitrust challenge. The FTC had significant concerns about this proposed acquisition, as it would have eliminated much of the remaining hospital competition in the area. After a legal challenge from rival hospital Lexington Medical Center, a South Carolina Administrative Court held that DHEC's incorporation of the LifePoint facilities into the original COPA was "outside the scope of the COPA's purposes."⁴⁵ Prisma and LifePoint then announced that they would no longer pursue the proposed acquisition.⁴⁶ Since then, the LifePoint assets were acquired by another health system that did not raise anticompetitive concerns. The court's decision is the first known holding that a COPA modification did not pass muster under the state action doctrine, and underscores that there are important and meaningful limitations to using COPAs to shield hospital mergers from antitrust scrutiny.

MaineHealth (Maine)

In March 2009, MaineHealth acquired Southern Maine Medical Center ("SMMC") under a COPA issued by the Maine Department of Health and Human Services. SMMC is located about 20 miles from MaineHealth's flagship general acute care hospital in Portland, Maine Medical Center ("MMC"), and the combined organization has a dominant share of patient discharges in the SMMC service area. The COPA terms required MaineHealth to limit SMMC's operating profit margin and reduce expenses, as well as expand access and maintain quality. But the COPA did not impose any conditions on the other hospitals operated by MaineHealth, including MMC. In accordance with the state COPA law, the MaineHealth COPA expired after six years in May 2015.

Empirical research on the price and quality effects of the MaineHealth COPA for inpatient hospital services from 2003 to 2018 showed varying results for the regulated SMMC hospital and the unregulated MMC hospital. During the COPA period, SMMC's prices increased by about 8% to 13% compared to peer hospitals, but this increase was not statistically significant and the conclusion is that the COPA was largely effective at constraining SMMC's prices during the COPA period. However, SMMC's prices increased by almost 50% following the expiration of the COPA in 2015. At MMC, prices increased by 38% during the COPA period, and by 62% following the expiration of the COPA (for an average of 50% during the entire post-merger period). Furthermore, SMMC's quality declined across most measures following the expiration of the COPA. The study summarizes as follows:

These results highlight the deficiencies of the MaineHealth COPA, which only placed restrictions on SMMC's price, not that of MMC or any other MaineHealth hospital. The evidence suggests that MaineHealth was able to exercise the market power gained in the SMMC acquisition (and possibly other acquisitions) through a price increase at the unregulated MMC.

Recent COPAs and Developments

[Ballad Health System \(Tennessee/Virginia\) and Cabell Huntington Hospital \(West Virginia\)](#)

In January 2018, Mountain States Health Alliance and Wellmont Health System are competitors in the

pricing issues relating to the rapid closure of outpatient surgical facilities, trauma centers, and NICUs, as well as difficult payer negotiations that they claim have hindered the transition to value-based contracting.

Endnote References

¹ This policy paper represents the views of the staff of the Federal Trade Commission. It does not necessarily represent the views of the Commission or of any individual Commissioner. The Commission, however, has voted to authorize staff to issue this policy paper.

² See, e.g. FTC Staff Submissions Regarding the Proposed Merger and COPA Applications of Mountain States Health Alliance

and Acquisition, 382 N.Eng. J. Med. 51 (Jan. 2, 2020),
<https://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMsaf901383?articleTools=tr> For surveys of the research literature, see, e.g.
Martin Gaynor & Robert Town, THE IMPACT OF HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION UPDATE (Robert Wood Johnson Found., The Synthesis
Project, Policy Brief No. 9, 2012), http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2012/rwjf73261; Martin
Gaynor, Kate Ho & Robert Tow (ynt)-2l005 Tc 1T 0 m9.2 (i)-13.5a14-7.6 (9.7.6gani)-13.5zppatheow-, 1

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³⁸ FTC COPA Workshop Transcript: Session 1, [supra](#) note 34, Mark Callister remarks at 38. Mark Callister informed us that the Benefits Health COPA was opposed by medical professionals and citizens of Great Falls, and was supported by the payers. *Id.* at 37.

³⁹ FTC COPA Workshop Transcript: Session 1, [supra](#) note 34, Kendall Cotton remarks at 40.

⁴⁰ *Id.* at 41.

⁴¹ The Palmetto Health hospitals still operate under the COPA that was originally approved in 1997, although the degree of current active supervision by DHEC is questionable. In 2013, South Carolina cut funding for its Certificate of Need program, which encompasses the COPA program, thereby reducing the level of state monitoring.

⁴² See Garmon & Bhatt, [supra](#) note 33, at 20, 42.

⁴³ At that time, four general acute care hospitals served the Columbia-Based Statistical Area in addition to Baptist Healthcare and Richland Memorial: Providence Health in Columbia (later acquired by LifePoint), Lexington Medical Center in West Columbia, Kershaw Health in Camden (later acquired by LifePoint), and Fairfield Memorial Hospital in Winnsboro (closed in 2018). See Garmon & Bhatt, [supra](#) note 33, at 42 (“Baptist and Richland together represented 55 percent of the bed capacity in the Columbia CBSA and treated 66 percent of the commercially insured inpatients.”).

⁴⁴ See South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, Final Staff Decision In Re Prisma Health Midlands COPA (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.scdhec.gov/sites/default/files/media/document/FINAL_STAFF_DECISION_IN_RE_PRISMA_HEALTH_MIDLANDS_COPA_28-2020.pdf; Palmetto Health/JSC Medical Group, Prisma Health to Acquire Kershaw Health and Providence Health (Mar. 5, 2020), <https://phuscmg.org/news/prisma-health-to-acquire-kershaw-health-and-provide>

⁴⁵ In the Matter of Lexington County Health Services District Inc. v. South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, Prisma Health Midlands, Providence Hospital, LLC, Order Denying Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, Docket No. 20-AL-07-0108CC (SC Admin. Law Court, Nov. 2, 2020).

⁴⁶ See Dave Muoio, Prisma Health, LifePoint Health Call Off Sale of 3 South Carolina Hospitals, *Fierce Healthcare* (Apr. 13, 2021), <https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/hospitals/prisma-health-life-point-health-call-off-sale-three-south-carolina-hospitals>

⁴⁷ Garmon & Bhatt, [supra](#) note 33, at 2122, 34.

⁴⁸ *Id.* at 21.

⁴⁹ FTC staff investigated the proposed merger of Mountain States and Wellmont for more than two years. FTC staff submitted public comments and testimony to the Virginia and Tennessee state departments of health and offices of Attorneys General recommending denial of the COPA. See Staff Submissions Regarding the Proposed Merger and COPA Applications of Mountain States Health Alliance and Wellmont Health Systems, <https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/1540115/wellmont-health-mountain-states-health>.

⁵⁰ See Tennessee Dep’t of Health, Certificate of Public Advantage (COPA), <https://www.tn.gov/health/health-program-areas/health-planning/certificate-of-public-advantage.htm> (last accessed Aug. 4, 2022).

⁵¹ See Letter from Tennessee Office of the Attorney General to Ballad Health CEO (Mar. 31, 2020), <https://www.tn.gov/health/health-program-areas/health-planning/certificate-of-public-advantage.htm> (last accessed Aug. 4, 2022); Tennessee Dep’t. of Health, List of Suspended

